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1 Managerial Relevance Statement
The “accepted wisdom” in the supply contracts literature is that in single supplier/single retailer situations,
the supplier has no incentive to set a wholesale price that will maximize the channel’s proﬁts. Thus, simple
contracts based on wholesale price are considered ineﬃcient. This observation has motivated the study
of (the harder to implement) risk-sharing contracts which allow for ﬂexible allocation of the (optimal)
proﬁt. This paper demonstrates that when the supply channel is resource constrained, wholesale price
contracts can be as eﬃcient as risk-sharing contracts and even somewhat ﬂexible in allocating channel
proﬁt. Intuitively, the eﬃciency and proﬁt-allocation ﬂexibility of risk-sharing contracts are derived, in part,
from additional contract parameters. However, when a supply channel is resource constrained, the inherent
resource parameter (e.g., capacity, budget), is suﬃcient for enriching a wholesale price contract to have
the beneﬁts of a risk-sharing contract. More generally, we ﬁnd that resource parameters can enhance the
eﬃciency properties of risk-sharing contracts too.
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linear wholesale price contracts that coordinates the channel while allowing the supplier to make a proﬁt. We
prove this for the one-supplier/one-newsvendor supply channel as well as the many-supplier/one-newsvendor
channel conﬁguration (with each supplier selling a unique product). We analyze how this set of wholesale
prices changes as we change the channel’s capacity constraint. We also explore conditions under which
these channel-eﬃcient linear wholesale price contracts result from the equilibrium behavior of a newsvendor
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Lariviere and Porteus (2001) to allow for multiple suppliers as well as a capacity constraint at the newsvendor.
Finally, we ﬁnd the set of risk-sharing contracts (such as buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts) that
coordinate a constrained supply channel and contrast that set with the set of risk-sharing contracts that
coordinate an unconstrained channel.
Key words: Wholesale Price Contract; Supply Contracts; Channel Coordination; Capacity Constraint;
Newsvendor.
History: Submitted on February 17, 2007.
1. Introduction
There is a wealth of supply contracts available that coordinate a newsvendor’s decision for uncon-
strained supplier-retailer channels: buy-back contracts, revenue-sharing contracts, etc. (Cachon
2003) A contract coordinates the actions of a newsvendor for a supply channel if the contract
causes the newsvendor to take actions when solving his own decision problem that are also optimal
for the channel.1 Our paper shows that simpler contracts, namely linear wholesale price contracts,
(which are thought to be unable to coordinate a newsvendor’s decision for unconstrained channels)
can, in fact, coordinate a newsvendor’s procurement decision for resource-constrained channels.
This is relevant for supply channels in which capacity of some resource is limited. For example,
shelf space at retail stores, seats on airlines, warehouse space, procurement budgets, time available
for manufacturing, raw materials, etc. (Corsten 2006)
1 Sometimes we also say a contract channel-coordinates a newsvendor’s decision. Therefore, achieving coordination for
the channel equates to attaining channel optimality (and thus eﬃciency) when the newsvendor is allowed to decide
for himself.
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Towards the end of our paper we show how risk-sharing contracts such as buy-back and revenue-
sharing coordinate the procurement decision of a resource-constrained newsvendor thereby gener-
alizing the treatment of these contracts. But the primary insight we show in this paper, is that
if newsvendor capacity is a binding constraint, then a set of linear wholesale-price contracts can
coordinate the procurement decision of a capacity-constrained newsvendor.2 Furthermore, this set
includes wholesale prices that allow both the supplier and the newsvendor to proﬁt.
Wholesale price contracts are commonplace since they are straightforward and easy to imple-
ment. While risk-sharing contracts such as revenue-sharing agreements can coordinate a retailer’s
decision in a newsvendor setting, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) note that these alternative contracts
impose a heavier administrative burden. For example, these alternative contracts may require an
investment in information technology or a higher level of trust between the trading partners due
to the additional processes involved. Our stylized capacity-constrained newsvendor setting pro-
vides a laboratory for understanding the set of wholesale price contracts that lead the retailer
to take coordinating actions under various channel conﬁgurations: one-supplier/one-retailer and
multiple-suppliers/one-retailer.
In this paper, we are concerned with the coordination capability of wholesale price contracts for a
supply channel in both a negotiation setting and an equilibrium setting. In our negotiation setting,
we are concerned with the entire set of coordinating wholesale-price contracts. The wholesale
prices in this set are Pareto-optimal, a useful property for getting ‘win/win’ results in negotiation
settings. This is in contrast to an equilibrium setting, where choosing the wholesale price(s) is an
initial stage of a game for the supplier(s). In the equilibrium setting we explore conditions for the
game’s equilibria wholesale-price vector to coordinate the newsvendor’s procurement decision for
the channel (i.e., necessary and suﬃcient conditions so that the game’s equilibria are included in
the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts), and characterize the extent of the eﬃciency loss
when these conditions are violated.
1.1. Organization of this paper
In Section 2, we provide an overview of the supply contracts literature and emphasize the point
that the literature has underestimated and not considered the coordination capability of wholesale
2 In addition to capacity being a binding constraint, the relative power of the parties and their competitive environ-
ments are also important for the wholesale-price contract to coordinate the actions of the newsvendor in practice.
For example, even if the set of wholesale prices W(k) that coordinate the retailer’s actions is enlarged beyond the
supplier’s marginal cost (due to the retailer’s capacity constraint k), the retailer and supplier still need to agree upon
some wholesale price in that set. Their outside-alternatives and the power in the supply channel could determine if
some wholesale price in the set W(k) is acceptable for the parties involved.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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price contracts for a constrained supply channel. In Section 3, we provide a stylized 1-supplier/1-
retailer model and formally deﬁne what it means for a wholesale price contract to coordinate the
retailer’s ordering decision for a supply channel. This model is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5,
we extend the model to include more suppliers and generalize our earlier analysis. Section 6 shows
that the set of revenue-sharing and buyback contracts that coordinates a newsvendor’s decision
for a constrained channel is a superset of the set of coordinating contracts in the unconstrained
setting. Finally, we summarize our ﬁndings and provide managerial insights in Section 7.
2. Literature Review
The supply contracts literature has been based on the observation, pointed out, for example, by
Lariviere and Porteus (2001), that wholesale price contracts are simple but do not coordinate the
retailer’s order quantity decision for a supplier-retailer supply chain in a newsvendor setting. This
observation has led to the study of an assortment of alternative contracts. For example, buy back
contracts (Pasternack 1985), quantity ﬂexibility contracts (Tsay 1999), and many others. Cachon
(2003) provides an excellent survey of the many contracts and models that have been studied in
the supply contracts literature. The mindset surrounding wholesale price contract’s inability to
channel-coordinate is true under appropriate assumptions— which the supply contracts literature
has been implicitly assuming: that there are no capacity constraints (e.g., shelf space, budget, etc.).
As mentioned before, we also consider the case of multiple suppliers serving a single retailer. This
exploration is motivated, in part, by Cachon (2003) and Cachon and Lariviere (2005), who empha-
size that coordination for channel conﬁgurations with multiple suppliers has yet to be explored.
The relevant literature on multi-product newsvendors with side constraints (which has developed
independently from the coordination literature) includes Lau and Lau (1995), Abdel-Malek and
Montanari (2005a,b).
Considering capacity constraints in a supply channel is not new to the supply contracts literature.
However, most other papers in the literature consider choosing capacity as one stage of a game
(before downstream demand is realized) that also involves a production decision after demand is
ﬁnally realized (Cachon and Lariviere 2001, Gerchak and Wang 2004, Wang and Gerchak 2003,
Tomlin 2003). Our paper, although complementary to this stream of literature, does not involve an
endogenous capacity choice for any party but rather analyzes how an exogenous capacity constraint
determines the set of wholesale prices that can coordinate the retailer’s decision for the channel.
Pasternack (2001) considers an exogenous budget constraint, but not for the purposes of studying
coordination. Rather, he analyzes a retailer’s optimal procurement decision when the retailer has
two available strategies: buying on consignment and outright purchase.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
4 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
Also our paper is not the ﬁrst to reconsider wholesale price contracts and their beneﬁts beyond
simplicity. Cachon (2004) looks at how inventory risk is allocated according to wholesale price
contracts and the resulting impact on supply chain eﬃciency. As far as we are aware, our paper is
the ﬁrst to consider the coordination-capability of linear wholesale price contracts under a simple
capacity-constrained production/procurement newsvendor model.
3. Model
A risk-neutral retailer r faces a newsvendor problem in ordering from a risk-neutral supplier for a
single good: there is a single sales season, the retailer decides on an order quantity q and orders
well in advance of the season, the entire order arrives before the start of the season, and ﬁnally
demand is realized, resulting in sales for the retailer (without an opportunity for replenishment).
Without loss of generality, we assume that units remaining at the end of the season have no salvage
value and that there is no cost for stocking out.
The model’s parameters are summarized in Figure 1 with the arrows denoting the direction
of product ﬂow. In particular, the supplier has a ﬁxed marginal cost of c per unit supplied and
charges the retailer a wholesale price w ≥ c per unit ordered. The retailer’s price p per unit to
the market is ﬁxed, and we assume that p > w. For that price, the demand D is random with
probability density function (p.d.f.) f and cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F. We also
deﬁne ¯ F(x)
def = 1 − F(x) = P(D > x). We say that a c.d.f. F has the IGFR property (increasing
generalized failure rate), if g(x)
def =
x·f(x)
¯ F(x) is weakly increasing on the set of all x for which ¯ F(x)>0
(Lariviere and Porteus 2001). Most distributions used in practice (such as the Normal, the Uniform,
the Gamma, and the Weibull distribution) have the IGFR property.
We assume that the retailer’s capacity is constrained by some k >0; for example, the retailer can
only hold k units of inventory, or accept a shipment not larger than k. For a diﬀerent interpretation,
k could represent a constraint on the capacity of the channel or a budget constraint.
Figure 1 “single supplier & single capacity constrained retailer” model.
c w q
q ≤ k
p
D ∼ F
s r
Note. Supplier s with marginal cost c (per unit) oﬀers a product at wholesale price w (per unit) to a capacity-
constrained retailer r that faces uncertain demand D downstream, when the price for the product is ﬁxed at p (per
unit). The retailer must decide on a quantity q to order from the supplier.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Assumption 1. The p.d.f. f for the demand D has support [0,l], with l > k, on which it is
positive and continuous.
As a consequence, ¯ F(0)=1 and ¯ F is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing, and invertible
on (0,l).
3.1. Retailer’s problem
Faced with uncertain sales S(q)
def = min{q,D} (when ordering q units) and a wholesale price w (from
the supplier), the retailer decides on a quantity to order from the supplier in order to maximize
expected proﬁt πr(q)
def = E[pS(q)]−wq while keeping in mind the capacity constraint k. Namely, it
solves the following convex program with linear constraints in the decision variable, q:
RETAILER(k,w)
maximize pE[S(q)]−wq (1)
subject to k−q ≥0
q ≥0.
Because of our assumptions on the c.d.f. F, it can be shown that RETAILER(k,w) has a unique
solution which we denote by qr(w).
3.2. Channel’s problem
Denote the channel’s expected proﬁt by πs(q)
def = E[pS(q) − cq]. Under capacity constraint k,
the optimal order quantity qs for the system/channel is the solution to convex program (2),
CHANNEL(k). Note that CHANNEL(k) has identical linear constraints but a slightly altered
objective function when compared to RETAILER(k,w):
CHANNEL(k)
maximize pE[S(q)]−cq (2)
subject to k−q ≥0
q ≥0.
Again because of our assumptions on the c.d.f. F it can be shown that CHANNEL(k) also has
a unique solution which we denote by qs. We denote the unique solution, argmax0≤q<∞πs(q), for
the unconstrained channel problem by q∗. It is well known that q∗ = ¯ F −1(c/p) (e.g., Cachon and
Terwiesch (2006)). Because of convexity, it is also easily seen that qs =min{q∗,k}.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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3.3. Deﬁnition: Coordinating the retailer’s action
A wholesale price contract w coordinates the retailer’s ordering decision for the supply channel
when it causes the retailer to order the channel-optimal amount, i.e., qr(w) = qs. In Section 4 we
are interested in the following questions: For a ﬁxed capacity k, what is the set of wholesale prices
W(k) for which qr(w)=qs? What does this set W(k) resemble geometrically?
If there is no capacity constraint (or equivalently if k is very large), recall that ‘double marginal-
ization’ results in the retailer not ordering enough (i.e., qr(w) < qs) under any wholesale price
contract, w > c. In the next section, we will show that when the capacity constraint k is small
relative to demand, there exist a set of wholesale price contracts w > c that can coordinate the
retailer’s order quantity, i.e., qr(w)=qs.
4. Analysis
Our ﬁrst result describes the set of coordinating wholesale prices under a capacity constraint.
Theorem 1. In a 1-supplier/1-retailer conﬁguration where the retailer faces a newsvendor prob-
lem and has a capacity constraint k, any wholesale price
w ∈W(k)
def
=

c,p ¯ F(min{q
∗,k})

will coordinate the retailer’s ordering decision for the supply channel, i.e., qr(w)=qs. Furthermore,
if qr(w)=qs and c≤w ≤p, then w ∈W(k).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that if the capacity constraint k is larger than or equal to the unconstrained channel’s
optimal order quantity, q∗, then p ¯ F(min{q∗,k})=p ¯ F(q∗)=c, reducing to the ‘classic’ result in the
supply contracts literature. However, this is true only when the capacity constraint is not binding
for the channel (i.e., q∗ ≤k). When the capacity constraint k is binding for the channel (i.e., q∗ >k),
then any wholesale price w ∈ [c,p ¯ F(k)] will coordinate the retailer’s action and only wholesale
prices in the range [c,p ¯ F(k)] can coordinate the retailer’s action.
Many factors such as ‘power in the channel’, ‘outside alternatives’, ‘inventory risk exposure’,
and ‘competitive environment’ ultimately inﬂuence the actual wholesale price (selected from the
set [c,p]) charged by the supplier. In the unconstrained setting, regardless of these factors, coor-
dination is not possible with a linear wholesale price contract (because the supplier presumably
would not agree to price at cost). However, when the capacity constraint is binding for the channel,
coordination becomes possible (because the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts becomesSabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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[c,p ¯ F(k)] (rather than {c}) and ultimately depends on these other factors. Theorem 6 in Sec-
tion 4.4 considers a equilibrium setting where the retailer takes on all the inventory risk (akin to
the ‘Stackelberg game’ in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and ‘push mode’ in Cachon (2004)), and
provides additional conditions that must be met so that the ‘equilibrium’ wholesale price contract
is a member of the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts, [c,p ¯ F(k)].
4.1. Size of W(k).
The geometry of the set of wholesale prices W(k) that coordinate the retailer’s decision for the
supply channel is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 The set of wholesale prices that coordinates the actions of a single retailer when procuring from a
single supplier.
c p
p ¯ F(k) p ¯ F(q∗)
Note. Note that p ¯ F(q
∗) =c and W(k) = [c,p ¯ F(k)] (the interval denoted in bold) when k ≤ q
∗.
Note that the size of W(k) is increasing as k decreases. Corollary 1 formalizes this notion and
follows directly from Theorem 1 because ¯ F(k) is decreasing in k.
Corollary 1. If 0≤k1 ≤k2, then W(k2)⊆W(k1)⊆[c,p].
Thus, the more constrained the channel is with respect to the channel optimal order quantity, q∗,
the larger the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts W(k).
Consider two supply channels selling the same good with the same retail price p and supplier
cost c. Assume that the probability of excess demand in the ﬁrst channel is larger, in the sense
¯ F1(k) ≥ ¯ F2(k). Let Wi(k) denote the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts for channel i
when the channel is constrained by k units. The channel with the higher probability of excess
demand has a larger set of coordinating wholesale prices. Corollary 2 to Theorem 1 makes this
precise.
Corollary 2. Given two demand distributions F1 and F2, if ¯ F1(k)≥ ¯ F2(k)>0, then
W2(k)⊆W1(k)⊆[c,p].
Proof. See Appendix B.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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4.2. Revenue requirement implicit in W(k).
By agreeing to focus on the set W(k) in negotiating over a wholesale price for coordination pur-
poses, the supplier and retailer are implicitly agreeing to a ‘minimum share of expected revenue’
requirement for the retailer and thus a ‘maximum share of expected revenue’ restriction for the
supplier. This notion is formalized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If the capacity constraint k is binding for the channel (i.e., q∗ > k), then any
coordinating linear wholesale price contract w ∈ W(k) guarantees that the retailer receive at least
a fraction
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx−k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx of the channel’s expected revenue, and that the supplier receive at most
a fraction
k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx of the channel’s expected revenue. Furthermore, if F has the IGFR property,
then the supplier’s maximum revenue share is weakly decreasing as k increases.
Proof. See Appendix C.
An important distinction regarding the supplier and retailer ‘share of expected revenue’ guaran-
tees formalized in Theorem 2 is that the supplier’s share results in a guaranteed income (i.e., no
uncertainty) whereas the retailer’s share results in an uncertain income. For example, from Theo-
rem 2 there exists some wholesale price w ∈W(k), where the supplier receives a fraction
k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
of the expected channel revenue, pE[S(k)]. But the supplier’s income is certain, wk, whereas the
retailer’s income is an uncertain amount, pS(k)−wk.
As a numerical example, if
k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx = 1/2, the supplier can receive up to ﬁfty percent of the
expected channel revenue and still keep the channel coordinated, whereas we require that the
retailer receive at least ﬁfty percent of the revenue in order for the wholesale price to coordinate
the actions of the retailer.
Recall that the set of coordinating wholesale price contracts W(k) increases with the probability
¯ F(k) of excess demand, when k is held ﬁxed (Corollary 2). Theorem 3 formalizes a related idea:
the larger the expected excess demand, the greater the maximum possible share of revenue at the
supplier without sacriﬁcing channel-coordination.
Theorem 3. Consider two diﬀerent demands D1 and D2, with each Di associated with a c.d.f.
Fi, that have the same mean and such that ¯ F1(k)≥ ¯ F2(k). Suppose that (a) the capacity constraint
k is binding for the channel under both distributions (i.e., min{q∗
1,q∗
2}>k), and (b) E[(D1−k)+]≥
E[(D2 −k)+] (i.e., the expected excess demand under D1 is higher than that under D2). Then,
k· ¯ F1(k)
R k
0
¯ F1(x)dx
≥
k· ¯ F2(k)
R k
0
¯ F2(x)dx
.
Proof. See Appendix D.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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4.3. Wholesale price contracts and ﬂexibility in allocating channel-optimal proﬁt
The beneﬁts of risk sharing contracts in the unconstrained setting include the ability to channel-
coordinate the retailer’s decision as well as ﬂexibility (due to the extra contract parameters) that
allows for any allocation of the optimal channel proﬁt between the supplier and retailer. Cachon
(2003) provides excellent examples of the ‘channel-proﬁt allocation ﬂexibility’ inherent in these
more complex contracts.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that in a resource constrained setting, wholesale price contracts also
have ﬂexibility in allocating the channel-optimal proﬁt. Namely, these simpler contracts allow for
a range of divisions of the optimal channel proﬁt among the ﬁrms. The divisions allowed (without
losing coordination) depend on the channel’s capacity, k. Similar to our observations in Section 4.2
for the implicit revenue requirements, the supplier’s share results in a guaranteed income (i.e., no
uncertainty) whereas the retailer’s share results in an uncertain income.
Theorem 4. If the capacity constraint is binding for the channel (i.e., q∗ > k), there exists a
wholesale price contract w ∈ W(k) that can allocate a fraction ts of the channel-optimal proﬁt to
the supplier and a fraction 1−ts to the retailer, if and only if ts ∈[0,tmax
s (k; ¯ F)], where
t
max
s (k; ¯ F)
def
=
k·
  ¯ F(k)−c/p

R k
0
  ¯ F(x)−c/p

dx
.
Furthermore, if F has the IGFR property, then tmax
s (k; ¯ F) is weakly decreasing as k increases in
the range [0,q∗).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Let us interpret Theorem 4 at two extremes values for the capacity k. As k approaches q∗,
tmax
s (k; ¯ F) approaches zero. Thus the supplier can not get any fraction of the channel-optimal proﬁt
with any wholesale price contract from W(k) (this was to be expected because W(k) = {c} when
k ≥ q∗). At the other extreme, as k tends to zero, tmax
s (k; ¯ F) tends to one. Thus any allocation of
the channel-optimal proﬁt becomes possible with some wholesale price contract from W(k) (this
is natural, because as k tends to zero, the interval W(k) becomes [c,p]). See Figure 3.
Theorem 5 parallels Theorem 3 and makes precise the idea that when we serve a larger market
the ‘ﬂexibility’ in allocating the channel-optimal proﬁt ‘increases’.
Theorem 5. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3, we have
t
max
s (k; ¯ F1)≥t
max
s (k; ¯ F2).
Proof. See Appendix F.
Theorem 5 suggests that a supplier (and retailer) can ﬁnd ﬂexibility in proﬁt allocation by joining
a supply channel that serves a larger market.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Figure 3 Flexibility in allocating channel-optimal proﬁt as a function of the capacity constraint.
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Note. Demand is distributed according to a Gamma distribution with mean 10 and coeﬃcient of variation 2
−1/2 ≈
.707. The retail price is p = 10, and the cost is c = 4. (these are similar to parameters used in Cachon (2004)).
Thus, q
∗ ≈ 10.112. The shaded region denotes the fractions of proﬁt to the supplier consistent with a channel-optimal
outcome (i.e., the set [0,t
max
s (k; ¯ F)]). Or in other words, the shaded region represents the fractional allocations of
channel-optimal proﬁt to the supplier that are achievable with some wholesale price contract w ∈ W(k).
4.4. Equilibrium setting.
The equilibrium setting we analyze is a two-stage (Stackelberg) game. In the ﬁrst stage, the supplier
(the ‘leader’) sets a wholesale price w. In the second stage, the retailer (the ‘follower’ chooses
an optimal response q, given the wholesale price w. The supplier produces and delivers q units
before the sales season starts and oﬀers no replenishments. Both the supplier and retailer aim to
maximize their own proﬁt. The supplier’s payoﬀ function is πs(w;q) = (w −c)q and the retailer’s
payoﬀ function is πr(q;w)=E[pS(q)−wq]. Lariviere and Porteus (2001) analyze this Stackelberg
game, for an unconstrained channel with one supplier and one retailer. They ﬁnd that when F has
the IGFR property, the game results in a unique outcome (qe,we) deﬁned implicitly in terms of
the equations
p ¯ F(q
e)(1−g(q
e))−c=0, (3)
p ¯ F(q
e)−w
e =0, (4)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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where g is the generalized failure rate function g(y)
def = yf(y)/ ¯ F(y). Furthermore, they show that
the outcome is not channel optimal. In this section, and in Section 4.6, we explore the eﬃciency
of the outcome when the channel has a capacity constraint (i.e., q ≤k).
Theorem 6 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the channel’s capacity constraint k
for the Stackelberg game to result in a channel-optimal equilibrium.
Theorem 6. Assume F has the IGFR property. Consider the above described game, when the
channel capacity is k units. This game has a unique equilibrium, given by qeq(k)=min{k,qe} and
weq(k)=max{p ¯ F(k),we}, where qe and we are deﬁned by equations (3) and (4), respectively. This
equilibrium is channel optimal if and only if
k ≤q
e. (5)
Under this condition, we have qeq =k and weq =p ¯ F(k).
Proof. See Appendix G.
The function p ¯ F(y)(1−g(y))−c represents the supplier’s marginal proﬁt on the yth unit, when
y <k. When F has the IGFR property, the supplier’s marginal proﬁt is decreasing in y, while the
marginal proﬁt is nonnegative. This fact and equation (3) imply that inequality (5) is equivalent
to the inequality p ¯ F(k)(1−g(k))−c ≥ 0, which can be interpreted as a statement that the sup-
plier’s marginal proﬁt (when relaxing the capacity constraint) on the kth unit is greater than zero.
Therefore, inequality (5) suggests that when the capacity constraint is binding for the supplier’s
problem (the ‘leader’ in the Stackelberg game), then the outcome of the game is channel optimal
and vice-versa.
If the channel capacity k is ‘large enough’, so that inequality (5) is not satisﬁed, how ineﬃcient
is the channel? In Section 4.6, we provide a distribution-free ‘measuring stick’ for the eﬃciency
loss in channels with a capacity constraint.
4.5. When can both parties be better oﬀ?
The set of coordinating wholesale price contracts W(k) introduced in Theorem 1 has many merits
in a negotiation setting. For example, such contracts are Pareto optimal. In contrast, Theorem 7
examines the set of wholesale price contracts D(k) that have little merit in that they are Pareto-
dominated by some other wholesale price contract in [c,p]. A contract is Pareto-dominated if there
exists an alternative linear wholesale price contract that makes one party better oﬀ without making
any other party worse oﬀ. Having a complete picture of the contracts that are channel-optimal and
the contracts that are Pareto-dominated is helpful in a negotiation setting.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Theorem 7. Assume F has the IGFR property and that the quantity qe and wholesale price we
are deﬁned implicitly in terms of equations (3) and (4). If k ≤q∗, then the set of Pareto-dominated
wholesale price contracts D(k) is
D(k)
def
= (max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)},p]=(p ¯ F(min{q
e,k}),p].
Proof. See Appendix H.
Note that W(k) and D(k) are disjoint. Corollary 3 to Theorem 7 formalizes the idea that when
k is ‘small enough’, W(k) and D(k) partition the set [c,p]. Figure 4 illustrates these ideas when
demand has a Gamma distribution.
Figure 4 An example illustrating W(k) and D(k).
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Note. We use the same parameters as in Figure 3, resulting in q
∗ ≈ 10.112, q
e ≈ 4.784, and w
e ≈ 7.516. The set of
coordinating wholesale price contracts W(k) lies under the solid curve. The set of Pareto-dominated wholesale price
contracts D(k) lies above both the solid and dashed curves. The set of contracts that lie between the solid and dashed
curves are neither in W(k) nor in D(k). Such contracts do not coordinate the channel, but nevertheless, are not
Pareto dominated by coordinating wholesale contracts.
Corollary 3. Assume F has the IGFR property. If k ≤qe, then
W(k)∪D(k)=[c,p], (6)
W(k)∩D(k)=∅. (7)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Corollary 3 is especially interesting: it asserts that when capacity is small enough there are only two
types of contracts: ‘good contracts’, W(k), and ‘bad contracts’, D(k). Furthermore, both parties
will always have a reason to avoid the ‘bad contracts’ because they are Pareto-dominated by some
channel-optimal contract in the set W(k).
4.6. Eﬃciency Loss.
When the outcome of the Stackelberg game we described in Section 4.4 results in a wholesale
price contract that is not channel optimal, how much does the channel ‘lose’ as a result? What
is the ‘price’ paid for the ‘gaming’ between the supplier and retailer? To quantify the answer we
analyze the worst-case eﬃciency. Our deﬁnition of eﬃciency is related to the concept of Price of
Anarchy, “PoA”, as used by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), and Papadimitriou (2001).
PoA has been used as a ‘measuring stick’ in an assortment of gaming contexts: facility location
(Vetta 2002), traﬃc networks (Schulz and Moses 2003), resource allocation (Johari and Tsitsiklis
2004). More recently Perakis and Roels (2006) analyze the PoA for an assortment of supply channel
conﬁgurations with the IGFR restriction, but not for resource constrained channels. Theorem 8
complements their results, by providing an eﬃciency result for the Stackelberg game of Section 4.4,
in the presence of a capacity constraint k.
For a channel with a capacity constraint k and probability ¯ F(k) of excess demand, we deﬁne the
parameter β
def =
max{ ¯ F(k),c/p}
c/p . The parameter β depends on the probability ¯ F(k) of excess demand
and takes values from the set [1,p/c]. It quantiﬁes how constrained the channel is with respect to
the channel optimal order quantity q∗, because β
def =
max{ ¯ F(k),c/p}
c/p =
max{ ¯ F(k), ¯ F(q∗)}
¯ F(q∗) . In the Stackelberg
game with a capacity constraint k and parameter β, the eﬃciency, Eﬀ(k,β), is deﬁned according
to equation (8) below.
Eﬀ(k,β)= inf
F∈F(k,β)
Channel proﬁt under ‘gaming’
Optimal channel proﬁt
= inf
F∈F(k,β)
E[pS(qeq(k))−cqeq(k)]
E[pS(qs(k))−cqs(k)]
(8)
The set F(k,β) represents the set of probability distributions that satisfy Assumption 1, have the
IGFR property, and such that the probability ¯ F(k) of excess demand satisﬁes
max{ ¯ F(k),c/p}
c/p = β.
Note that Eﬀ(k,β) is a distribution-free method of quantifying the worst-case eﬃciency. When
Eﬀ(k,β) is low (much smaller than one), there is signiﬁcant eﬃciency loss due to ‘gaming’.
Theorem 8. Deﬁne m
def
= (p−c)/p (the channel’s gross proﬁt margin). For the Stackelberg game
described in Section 4.4, we have
Eﬀ(k,β)=
β −1+m
m
1
β
·
1
1−m
1/m
−
 1
1−m
−1
. (9)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
14 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Note that Eﬀ(k,β) is decreasing in the channel’s gross proﬁt margin m and increasing in β.
When β =1, the channel is not constrained and Eﬀ(k,β) equals
 
1
1−m
1/m
−
1
1−m
−1
which, after
some algebraic manipulation, matches the result in Perakis and Roels (2006). On the other hand,
when the channel is most constrained (i.e., k ≈0, ¯ F(k)≈1, and β ≈p/c), then Eﬀ(k,β) simpliﬁes
to 1. In other words there is no eﬃciency loss because the equilibrium outcome involves the retailer
ordering exactly k. Our result is thus a more general version of the ‘two-stage push-mode PoA’
result in Perakis and Roels (2006) in that we account for a capacity constraint. Also our proof
technique diﬀers from and complements Perakis and Roels (2006), in that we indirectly optimize
over the space of probability distributions by optimizing over the space of generalized failure rates.
Figure 5 An example illustrating Eﬀ(k,β) when m= 0.35.
1.0
0.8
0.6
1.5
0.2
0.0
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
0.9
0.7
0.5
beta
0.4
0.3
0.1
1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
Note. We ﬁx the margin (p−c)/p= 0.35 and see how Eﬀ(k,β) changes as a function of β.
Figure 5 provides an example of the Eﬀ(k,β) when the channel’s gross proﬁt margin is 35 percent.
Figure 5 illustrates that for channels with smaller capacity (i.e., higher β), the worst-case eﬃciency
(as measured by Eﬀ(k,β)) is larger.
5. Extension to the case of Multiple Suppliers
We consider a retailer who orders from multiple suppliers (where each supplier oﬀers one diﬀeren-
tiated product), subject to a constraint on the total amount of inventory that can be stocked. TheSabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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market price for each product is ﬁxed. The retailer faces a random demand for each one of the
products (product substitution is not allowed), which is independent of the quantities stocked. In
this context, the retailer must make a portfolio decision: which suppliers to order from, and how
much to order from each.
For this model, we explore questions similiar to those studied for the single-product case. Do there
exist nontrivial (wholesale price diﬀerent than the unit cost) wholesale contracts that coordinate
the retailer’s portfolio decision, resulting in an order quantity vector which is optimal from the
channel’s point of view? How does the set of coordinating wholesale price vectors change as we
change the retailer’s capacity constraint? Is everyone better oﬀ or no worse oﬀ by picking a wholesale
price vector in this set? We will show that our main ﬁndings for the 1-supplier/1-retailer case
(Theorems 1 and 6) extend to this more general setting with many suppliers.
5.1. Many-suppliers/1-retailer model
A risk-neutral retailer r orders from m ≥ 2 risk-neutral suppliers, for m diﬀerent goods, diﬀer-
entiated by supplier. There is a single sales season, the retailer decides on an order quantity
vector/portfolio (q1,q2,...,qm) and orders well in advance of the season, the entire order arrives
before the start of the season, and ﬁnally demand is realized, resulting in sales for the retailer
(without an opportunity for replenishment). Without loss of generality, units remaining at the end
of the season are assumed to have no salvage value, and there is no cost for stocking out.
Supplier i has a ﬁxed marginal cost of ci per unit supplied and charges the retailer a wholesale
price wi ≥ci per unit ordered. The retailer’s price pi per unit to the market for good i is ﬁxed and,
at that price, the demand for good i, Di, is random with p.d.f. fi and c.d.f. Fi. We assume that
the demands Di are independent random variables, in the sense that their distribution does not
depend on the ordered quantities (q1,q2,...,qm).
The retailer’s total capacity is again constrained by some k > 0. We assume that the capacity
as well as the quantities of the diﬀerent products are measured with a common set of units (e.g.,
shelf-space), so that the capacity constraint can be expressed in the form q1 + ··· + qm ≤ k. The
models parameters are summarized in Figure 6, with the arrows denoting the direction of product
ﬂow.
As before, we assume that the p.d.f. fi for the demand Di has support [0,li], with li >k, on which
it is positive and continuous. As a consequence, ¯ Fi(0) = 1 and ¯ Fi is continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly decreasing, and invertible on (0,li).Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Figure 6 “m suppliers & 1 capacity constrained retailer” model with independent downstream demands.
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Note. There are m suppliers. Supplier si with marginal cost ci (per unit) oﬀers good i at wholesale price wi (per unit)
to a capacity-constrained retailer r who faces uncertain demand Di downstream with c.d.f. Fi (for good i) when the
price for the good is ﬁxed at pi (per unit). The retailer decides on a portfolio of goods to order from the suppliers.
5.2. Retailer’s problem
For product i ∈ {1,...,m}, let Si(q)
def = min{q,Di} denote the (uncertain) amount of sales for
product i given that the retailer orders qi units of product i. The retailer decides on a quantity vector
qr(w)=(qr
1,qr
2,...,qr
m) to order (for a given wholesale price vector w) that maximizes the expected
proﬁt πr(q)
def = E[
Pm
i=1pimin{qi,Di}−wiqi], subject to the capacity constraint k. In particular, it
solves the following convex program with linear constraints in the decision vector, q:
RETAILER(k,w)
maximize
m X
i=1
 
piE[Si(qi)]−wiqi

(10)
subject to k−
m X
i=1
qi ≥0
qi ≥0, i=1,...,m.
Because of our assumptions on the distribution of the demand Di for each product, it can be
shown that RETAILER(k,w) has a unique solution (vector), which we denote by qr(w).
5.3. Channel’s problem
Given the channel’s expected proﬁt πs(q)
def = E[
Pm
i=1pimin{qi,Di}−ciqi] and capacity constraint k,
the optimal order quantity vector qs for the system/channel is the solution to the following convex
program, CHANNEL(k), with the same linear constraints on the decision vector, q, but a slightly
altered objective function:
CHANNEL(k)
maximize
m X
i=1
 
piE[Si(qi)]−ciqi

(11)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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subject to k−
m X
i=1
qi ≥0
qi ≥0, i=1,...,m.
Again, because of our assumptions on the demand distributions, it can be shown that
CHANNEL(k) also has a unique solution (vector) which we denote by qs. Finally, we denote the
unique solution for the unconstrained channel problem, max0≤q<∞πs(q), by q∗.
5.4. The set W(k).
In this subsection, (cf. Theorem 9 below), we derive conditions under which the vector w =
(w1,...,wm) belongs to the set W(k) of wholesale price vectors that coordinate the retailer’s order
quantity vector, i.e., qr(w)=qs.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that the capacity constraint is binding for the channel,
that is,
Pm
i=1q∗
i ≥k or equivalently
m X
i=1
¯ F
−1
i
ci
pi

≥k.
Otherwise, the problem degenerates into m standard 1-supplier/1-retailer problems in which the
only way to coordinate the retailer’s action for the supply channel is with a wholesale price contract
w =(c1,..,cm).
Theorem 9. Let Z = {i | q∗
i = 0} ⊂ M = {1,...,m} be the set of products that are not ordered
in the channel’s portfolio decision problem, and deﬁne λm+1 implicitly by the equation:
X
j∈M\Z
F
−1
j
pj −cj −λm+1
pj

=k.
For any wholesale price vector w =(w1,w2,...,wm), the following two conditions are equivalent.
(a) The vector w coordinates the retailer’s portfolio decision, i.e., qr(w)=qs.
(b) There exists some α that satisﬁes
α∈[0,λm+1], (12)
wj =cj +α, ∀ j ∈M \Z, (13)
wj ≥pj −λm+1 +α, ∀ j ∈Z. (14)
Proof. See Appendix J.
Let W(k) be the set of all w for which qr(w) = qs. If Z = ∅ (so that every product is in the
channel’s optimal portfolio), W(k) can be represented geometrically by a line segment that starts
at the point (c1,c2,...,cm), has unit partial derivatives, and ends at the intersection of the line
with the set of vectors w that satisfy
Pm
i=1 ¯ F
−1
i (
wi
pi )=k. More generally, if Z 6=∅, then W(k) is the
set described by the conditions (12) through (14).Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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5.5. The Stackelberg game with multiple suppliers.
We now consider a generalization of the Stackelberg game analyzed in Section 4.4. In the ﬁrst
stage, all the suppliers (the ‘leaders’) simultaneously choose their wholesale prices wi. In the second
stage, the retailer (the ‘follower’) chooses an order quantity vector q. When does an equilibrium
wholesale price vector of this game belong to the set W(k)? A full exploration of this and other
questions related to this interesting game is beyond the scope of this paper and is reported elsewhere
(Sabbaghi et al. 2007). We only provide here one result that connects to and generalizes Theorem 6.
Theorem 10. Assume the game is symmetric for the suppliers, that is, ci =c, pi =p, and Fi =
F, for every supplier i. Furthermore, assume that F has the IGFR property. Recall the deﬁnition
of qe given in equation (3). If k ≤m·qe, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium that belongs to
W(k).
Proof. See Appendix K.
6. Risk sharing contracts
We have provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions so that linear wholesale price contracts coor-
dinate a newsvendor’s procurement decision and allow both the supplier(s) and the newsvendor
to proﬁt. A natural related question is whether more complicated contracts such as buy-back con-
tracts and revenue-sharing contracts also coordinate a newsvendor’s procurement decision when
the newsvendor is capacity-constrained.
In this section, we prove that revenue-sharing contracts and buy-back contracts continue to
coordinate a newsvendor’s ordering decision even when the newsvendor has a constrained resource.
Furthermore, we examine the advantages of these more complex contracts over a linear wholesale
price contract for a constrained newsvendor.
6.1. Buyback and revenue-sharing contracts for unconstrained newsvendor’s still
coordinate
In Theorem 11, we show that buyback contracts, which are known to coordinate an unconstrained
newsvendor’s procurement decision, continue to coordinate a constrained newsvendor’s procure-
ment decision.
Theorem 11. Consider a 1-supplier/1-retailer conﬁguration in the presence of a capacity con-
straint k ≥0. Buyback and revenue sharing contracts coordinate the retailer’s ordering decision for
the channel, and allow for any proﬁt allocation. In particular, the buyback and revenue sharing
contracts that coordinate an unconstrained retailer (in the corresponding unconstrained channel)
continue to coordinate the constrained retailer’s order decision and allow for any proﬁt allocation.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Proof. See Appendix L.
Figure 7 illustrates the set of buyback contracts (w,b) that channel-coordinate a capacity-
constrained newsvendor (as well as unconstrained retailer) as described in Theorem 11. The buy-
back contracts in Figure 7 are the only buyback contracts that can coordinate an unconstrained
newsvendor. However, the buyback contracts in Figure 7 are not the only buyback contracts that
can coordinate a constrained newsvendor. There are more. In Subsection 6.2 we ﬁnd necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for a buyback contract (w,b) to coordinate a capacity-constrained newsvendor.
Figure 7 Some buyback contracts (w,b) that channel-coordinate a constrained newsvendor.
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Note. The buyback contracts (w,b) that channel-coordinate an unconstrained newsvendor’s ordering decision (the
ones graphed in this ﬁgure) still coordinate a capacity-constrained newsvendor. ¯ F(k)p is labelled on the y-axis purely
for comparison with Figure 8.
6.2. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for coordination
In Theorem 12, we show that the set of buyback contracts that coordinate an constrained newsven-
dor’s procurement decision is a superset of the set of buyback contracts that coordinate an uncon-
strained newsvendor’s procurement decision.
Theorem 12. Consider a 1-supplier/1-retailer conﬁguration in the presence of a capacity con-
straint k ≥ 0, and assume that ¯ F(k) > c/p. A buy-back contract (w,b) ∈ {(u,v) | c ≤ u ≤ p, v ≤ u}
coordinates a newsvendor’s procurement decision for the channel if and only if
(w,b)∈{(u,v) | u=(1−λ)v +λp, λ∈

c/p, ¯ F(k)

}.
Proof. See Appendix M.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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Notice that if capacity becomes large enough (so that k ≥q∗), then the set of coordinating buy-
back contracts implied by Theorem 12 and Figure 8 simpliﬁes to the ‘classical’ set of coordinating
buyback contracts implied by Theorem 11 and Figure 7.
Figure 8 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a buyback contract (w,b) to channel-coordinate a constrained
newsvendor.
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Note. The shaded area represents all the buyback contracts (w,b) that channel-coordinate a capacity-constrained
newsvendor when k ≤ q
c. Compare with Figure 7.
7. Discussion
One of the reasons that revenue-sharing, buyback, and an assortment of other contracts are able
to coordinate the retailer in an unconstrained setting is because those contracts have two or more
parameters. Intuitively, the ‘ﬂexibility’ of those parameters creates contracts where the retailer has
an incentive to order the system-optimal amount and that allows the supplier to earn a proﬁt.
Interestingly, our model also introduces another ‘parameter’, capacity. But capacity is not part of
the contract. Rather it is part of the system. So instead of introducing complexity into the contract
(with another contract parameter) one should check if an inherent resource parameter (such as
capacity) can lead to the use of simpler contracts.
Demand and capacity are both levers in the system. If demand is large relative to capacity for
the channel’s problem, then wholesale price contracts that coordinate the channel and allow both
the supplier and retailer to proﬁt exist. Consequently the potential to reach a channel optimal
outcome in a negotiation setting exists.
Furthermore, in the Stackelberg game (Section 4.4) where the supplier acts as the ‘leader’, if
the capacity constraint is tight, the equilibrium outcome is channel optimal. Otherwise, when theSabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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equilibrium is not eﬃcient (because the capacity k is not small enough), we provide a distribution-
free worst-case characterization of the eﬃciency loss, as measured by Eﬀ(k,β) (see Section 4.6).
Another lesson for constrained channels is that buyback and revenue sharing contracts still
coordinate the channel (see Section 6.1). And those contracts coordinate the constrained channel
for a larger set of parameters than for the unconstrained case.
Cachon (2003) mentions that coordination in multiple supplier settings has not been explored.
Theorems 9 and 10 are initial steps in that direction.
Resource constraints are a part of many supply channels. This paper shows that taking them
into consideration in the analysis is important in assessing the actual eﬃciency of contracts for
constrained channels.
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Appendix
In order to not disrupt the ﬂow of presentation, the proofs for our results are contained here.
A. Proof: 1-supplier/1-retailer, Set of wholesale prices W(k)
Proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving that if w ∈ W(k), then q
r(w) = q
s. Suppose ﬁrst that q
∗ ≤ k.
We then have p ¯ F(min{q
∗,k}) = p ¯ F(q
∗) = c. Therefore, W(k) = {c}. Thus, for any w ∈ W(k), the problems
RETAILER(k,w) and CHANNEL(k) are the same and q
r(w)=q
s.
Suppose now that q
∗ > k. We then have q
s = k and, furthermore, p ¯ F(min{q
∗,k}) = p ¯ F(k) > p ¯ F(q
∗) = c.
(The strict inequality is obtained because ¯ F is strictly decreasing.) Therefore, W(k) = [c,p ¯ F(k)]. Solving
∂
∂x
 
E[pS(x)]−p ¯ F(k)x

= 0 for x ∈ [0,l] and noting
∂S(x)
∂x = ¯ F(x), we obtain q
r(p ¯ F(k)) = k. Since q
r(w) is
nondecreasing as we decrease w, we see that for all w ∈W(k), q
r(w)=k =q
s.
Suppose now that q
r(w)=q
s and c≤w ≤p. We have shown that
W(k)=
(
{c}, if q
∗ ≤k;
[c,p ¯ F(k)], if q
∗ >k.
When q
∗ ≤ k, the ﬁrst order conditions imply that p ¯ F(q
r(w)) − w = 0 = p ¯ F(q
s) − c for any w ≥ c, which
implies w must equal c. When q
∗ > k, we know that q
s = k. Assume w > p ¯ F(k) when q
r(w) = q
s. Due to
invertibility around k, q
r(w)<k. This is a contradiction because q
s =q
r(w)<k. 
B. Proof: Impact of size of Market on size of W(k)
Proof of Corollary 2. Let q
∗
i = ¯ F
−1
i (c/p) be the order quantity (for an unconstrained channel) under the
demand distribution Fi.
If k ≤ q
∗
2, then c/p ≤ ¯ F2(k) ≤ ¯ F1(k), which implies that k ≤ q
∗
1. Thus, Wi(k) = [c,p ¯ Fi(k)] for i ∈ 1,2. Since
¯ F2(k)≤ ¯ F1(k), we can conclude that W2(k)⊆W1(k)⊆[c,p].
Similarly, if q
∗
2 <k, then W2(k)={c}. Thus, W2(k)⊆W1(k). Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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C. Proof: Revenue requirement implicit in W(k)
Proof of Theorem 2. If the capacity constraint k is binding for the channel (i.e., q
∗ > k), then W(k) =

c,p ¯ F(k)

. For any wholesale price, the supplier’s fraction of expected revenue is rs(w)
def = wq(w)/E[pS(q(w))]
where q(w) is the retailer’s order quantity for a wholesale price w. Thus for any coordinating linear wholesale
price contract w ∈W(k),
rs(w)=
wk
E[pS(k)]
=
wk
p
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
.
The maximum possible value for rs(w), when w ∈W(k), is
r
max
s (k; ¯ F)=
 
p ¯ F(k)

k
pE[S(k)]
=
k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
.
Accordingly, the expected revenue that the retailer receives with any linear wholesale price contract w ∈W(k)
is at least a fraction
1−
k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
=
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx−k· ¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
of the total.
Next we show that if F has the IGFR property, then rmax
s (k; ¯ F) is weakly decreasing as k increases. We
ﬁrst note that
∂rmax
s (k; ¯ F)
∂k
=
¯ F(k)
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx
·
 
1−g(k)−r
max
s (k; ¯ F)

, (15)
where g(x)
def =
xf(x)
¯ F(x) is the generalized failure rate function. From L’Hˆ opital’s rule, we also have
limk→0rmax
s (k; ¯ F) = 1. Furthermore, the function rmax
s (k; ¯ F) is bounded above by 1 and goes to zero as
k → ∞. If this function is not weakly decreasing, there must exist some value t such that the derivative of
rmax
s (k; ¯ F) at t is zero, and positive for values slightly larger than t. We then have
r
max
s (t; ¯ F)=1−g(t) (16)
since the derivative of rmax
s (k; ¯ F) at t is zero. For k slightly larger than t, the function rmax
s (k; ¯ F) increases,
and g(k) is nondecreasing, by the IGFR assumption. But then, equation (15) implies that the derivative of
rmax
s (k; ¯ F) is negative, which is a contradiction. 
D. Proof: Revenue requirement as we ‘vary’ F
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that
R k
0
¯ Fi(x)dx=(
R ∞
0
¯ Fi(x)dx)−(
R ∞
k
¯ Fi(x)dx)=E[Di]−E[(Di−k)·1{Di>k}].
Thus,
Z k
0
¯ F1(x)dx=E[D1]−E[(D1 −k)·1{D1>k}]
=E[D2]−E[(D1 −k)·1{D1>k}]
≤E[D2]−E[(D2 −k)·1{D2>k}]
=
Z k
0
¯ F2(x)dx. (17)
The inequalities (17) and ¯ F1(k)≥ ¯ F2(k) imply that
¯ F1(k) R k
0
¯ F1(x)dx ≥
¯ F2(k) R k
0
¯ F2(x)dx. Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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E. Proof: W(k)’s ﬂexibility in allocating the channel-optimal proﬁt
Proof of Theorem 4. We ﬁrst recall that given our assumption k < q
∗, the set of coordinating wholesale
price contracts is W(k)=

c,p ¯ F(k)

.
First we prove that ts ∈[0,tmax
s (k; ¯ F)], if and only if there exists a wholesale price contract w ∈W(k) such
that w allocates a fraction ts of the channel-optimal proﬁt to the supplier (and thus a fraction 1−ts to the
retailer).
For any wholesale price w, the supplier’s fraction of the channel’s expected proﬁt is ts(w)
def =
(w−c)q(w)
E[pS(q(w))−cq(w)]
where q(w) is the retailer’s order quantity for a wholesale price w. For any coordinating linear wholesale
price contract w ∈W(k), the retailer orders k units; thus we can simplify ts(w):
ts(w)=
(w−c)k
E[pS(k)]−ck
=
k(w/p−c/p)
R k
0
  ¯ F(x)−c/p

dx
. (18)
Observe that ts(c)=0, ts(p ¯ F(k))=tmax
s (k; ¯ F), and ts(w) is strictly increasing and continuous in w for w ∈

c,p ¯ F(k)

. Thus, ts(w) is a one-to-one and onto map from the domain

c,p ¯ F(k)

to the range [0,tmax
s (k; ¯ F)].
Next we show that if F has the IGFR property, then tmax
s (k; ¯ F)
def =
k·( ¯ F(k)−c/p) R k
0 ( ¯ F(x)−c/p)dx is weakly decreasing
as k increases. Deﬁne ¯ H(x) =
¯ F(x)−c/p
1−c/p . Since ¯ F(q
∗) = c/p, ¯ H(x) restricted to the domain [0,q
∗) is equal to
1−H(x), where H is a c.d.f. with support [0,q
∗).
The generalized failure rate function gH(x) for H, deﬁned in equation (19) below, can be rewritten in
terms of the generalized failure rate function gF(x) for F, as follows:
gH(x)
def = −
x
∂ ¯ H(x)
∂x
¯ H(x)
(19)
=
xf(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p
=
¯ F(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p
·
xf(x)
¯ F(x)
=
¯ F(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p
·gF(x). (20)
Furthermore,
∂
∂x
 ¯ F(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p

=
f(x)·c/p
( ¯ F(x)−c/p)2 ≥0, (21)
which implies that
¯ F(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p is weakly increasing (over the domain [0,q
∗)).
Since
¯ F(x)
¯ F(x)−c/p is positive and weakly increasing and F has the IGFR property, we can deduce that H also
has the IGFR property when restricted to the domain [0,q
∗) (because of equation (20)).
Then, Theorem 2 (applied to ¯ H) implies that
k· ¯ H(k) R k
0
¯ H(x)dx is weakly decreasing as k increases (while k is
restricted to the domain [0,q
∗)). But tmax
s (k; ¯ F)=
k· ¯ H(k) R k
0
¯ H(x)dx, which proves that tmax
s (k; ¯ F) is weakly decreasing
as k increases (and k <q
∗). Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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F. Proof: Flexibility in allocating the channel-optimal proﬁt as we ‘vary’ F
Proof of Theorem 5. Given the deﬁnition of tmax
s (k; ¯ F) (cf. Theorem 4), we need to prove that
¯ F1(k)−c/p
R k
0
  ¯ F1(x)−c/p

dx
≥
¯ F2(k)−c/p
R k
0
  ¯ F2(x)−c/p

dx
. (22)
We know that ¯ F1(k)≥ ¯ F2(k) and that the capacity constraint is binding for the channel’s problem under
both distributions. Thus,
¯ F1(k)−c/p≥ ¯ F2(k)−c/p>0. (23)
From inequality (17) in the proof of Theorem 3, we also know that
R k
0
¯ F1(x)dx ≤
R k
0
¯ F2(x)dx. Thus, we
can deduce that
0<
Z k
0
  ¯ F1(x)−c/p

dx≤
Z k
0
  ¯ F2(x)−c/p

dx. (24)
Inequalities (23) and (24) imply that inequality (22) holds. 
G. Proof: When is the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game channel optimal?
Proof of Theorem 6. The retailer’s proﬁt function πr(q;w) under a wholesale price contract w is deﬁned as
πr(q;w)
def = E[pS(q)−wq]. Since πr(q;w) is concave, in q, we can use the ﬁrst order conditions and conclude
that for a wholesale price w ∈[c,p], the constrained retailer’s order quantity q
r(w) is given by
q
r(w)=min{k, ¯ F
−1(w/p)}. (25)
The supplier’s proﬁt function πs(w;q) under a wholesale price contract w is deﬁned as πs(w;q)
def = (w −c)q.
Since q
r(w) is the retailer’s best response in the second stage to a wholesale price w by the supplier in the
ﬁrst stage, equation (25) allows us to express the supplier’s objective function as follows:
πs(w)=
(
(w−c)k, if c≤w ≤max{c,p ¯ F(k)};
 
p ¯ F(q
r(w))−c

q
r(w), if max{c,p ¯ F(k)}<w ≤p.
(26)
For w > max{c,p ¯ F(k)}, note that
∂πs(w)
∂w =
 
p ¯ F(q
r(w))(1−g(q
r(w)))−c

·
∂qr(w)
∂w . Since the function
p ¯ F(y)(1−g(y)) − c is strictly decreasing in y when it is nonnegative and equals zero at q
e (see equa-
tion (3)), we can deduce that
 
p ¯ F(q
r(w))(1−g(q
r(w)))−c

> 0 for w > w
e (because q
r(w) < q
e). Further-
more,
∂qr(w)
∂w <0 for w >p ¯ F(k). Therefore, we can conclude that
∂πs(w)
∂w <0 for w >max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)}.
Either the inequality p ¯ F(k) < w
e holds or the inequality w
e ≤ p ¯ F(k) holds. First assume the inequality
p ¯ F(k) < w
e holds. Equation (26) implies that πs(w) is increasing linearly between c and max{c,p ¯ F(k)}.
Furthermore, since
 
p ¯ F(q
r(w))(1−g(q
r(w)))−c

< 0 for w < w
e (because q
r(w) > q
e), we can deduce that
∂πs(w)
∂w =
 
p ¯ F(q
r(w))(1−g(q
r(w)))−c

·
∂qr(w)
∂w > 0 for w ∈ (max{c,p ¯ F(k)},w
e). And we know
∂πs(w)
∂w < 0
for w > max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)} = w
e. Therefore, w
eq(k) = w
e and equations (25) and (4) imply q
eq(k) = q
e. The
inequality p ¯ F(k)<w
e is equivalent to the inequality q
e <k (see equation (4)). Therefore, when q
e <k holds,
the inequality w
eq(k) = w
e > max{c,p ¯ F(k)} = p ¯ F(min{q
∗,k}) holds and we can deduce that w
eq(k) / ∈ W(k)
(using Theorem 1).
Next assume w
e ≤ p ¯ F(k) holds. Since
∂πs(w)
∂w < 0 for w > max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)} = max{c,p ¯ F(k)}, equation (26)
implies w
eq(k) = p ¯ F(k) and equation (25) implies q
eq(k) = k. The inequality w
e ≤ p ¯ F(k) is equivalent to
the inequality k ≤ q
e (see equation (4)). Therefore, when k ≤ q
e holds, the equality w
eq(k) = p ¯ F(k) =
max{c,p ¯ F(k)}=p ¯ F(min{q
∗,k}) holds and we can deduce that w
eq(k)∈W(k) (again using Theorem 1). Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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H. Proof: The set of Pareto-dominated contracts D(k) as a function of capacity
Proof of Theorem 7. Equation (25) allows us to express the retailer’s objective function as follows:
πr(w)=
(
pE[S(k)]−wk, if c≤w ≤p ¯ F(k);
pE[S(q
r(w))]−p ¯ F(q
r(w))q
r(w), if p ¯ F(k)<w ≤p.
(27)
Note that πr(w) is strictly decreasing in w, when w ∈(c,p ¯ F(k)). Furthermore, when w ∈(p ¯ F(k),p), note that
πr(w) is strictly decreasing in w because
∂πr(w)
∂w = p ¯ F(q
r(w))g(q
r(w))·
∂qr(w)
∂w < 0. From the proof of Theo-
rem 6, we know that the supplier’s proﬁt πs(w) is also strictly decreasing for w >max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)}. Therefore,
any wholesale price contract in the set (max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)},p] is Pareto-dominated by max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)}.
Since the supplier’s proﬁt is decreasing as the wholesale price w decreases from max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)} (see the
proof of Theorem 6) but the retailer’s proﬁt is increasing as the wholesale price decreases, we can conclude
that any wholesale price contract in the set [c,max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)}] is not Pareto-dominated. Thus, the set of
Pareto-dominated wholesale price contracts in [c,p] is exactly D(k)=(w
e,p]=(max{w
e,p ¯ F(k)},p]. 
I. Proof: Eﬃciency loss for a two-stage push channel with capacity constraint
Lemma 1. Assume F has the IGFR property and that the quantity q
e is deﬁned implicitly in terms of
equation (3). If q
e ≤k ≤q
s, then
p
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx

−ck
p
R qe
0
¯ F(x)dx

−cqe
≤
 
k
qe
 
m−1+
1
1−m

k
qe
−m!
−
1
1−m
+1
!
/m. (28)
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall the generalized failure rate function g(y) for c.d.f. F is deﬁned as g(y)
def =
−y
∂ ¯ F(y)
∂y / ¯ F(y). Since ¯ F(y)=e
−
R y
0 f(t)/ ¯ F(t)dt =e
−
R y
0 g(t)/tdt, we have
p
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx

−ck
p
R qe
0
¯ F(x)dx

−cqe
=
p
R k
0 e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−ck
p
R qe
0 e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cqe
=1+
p
R k
qe e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−c(k−q
e)
p
R qe
0 e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cqe
. (29)
For any y ∈[q
e,k], deﬁne the proﬁt-gain factor a(y) by
a(y)
def =

p
Z y
qe
e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−c(y −q
e)

/

p
Z qe
0
e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cq
e

. (30)
The derivative
∂a(y)
∂y is expressed via equation (31) below, when y ∈[q
e,k], leading to the following nonnegative
upper bound:
∂a(y)
∂y
=

pe
−
R y
0 g(t)/tdt −c

/

p
Z qe
0
e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cq
e

(31)
≤

pe
−
R qe
0 g(t)/tdt−
R y
qe g(qe)/tdt −c

/

p
Z qe
0
e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cq
e

(32)
=
 
p

y
qe
−g(qe)
e
−
R qe
0 g(t)/tdt −c
!
/

p
Z qe
0
e
−
R x
0 g(t)/tdtdx

−cq
e

≤
 
p

y
qe
−g(qe)
e
−
R qe
0 g(t)/tdt −c
!
/

p

q
ee
−
R qe
0 g(t)/tdt

−cq
e

(33)
=
 
p

y
qe
−g(qe)
¯ F(q
e)−c
!
/
 
p ¯ F(q
e)−c

q
e (34)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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≤
 
p

y
qe
−(p−c)/p
−c
!
/(p−c)q
e (35)
=
 
y
qe
−m
+(m−1)
!
/(mq
e). (36)
Therefore,
p
R k
0
¯ F(x)dx

−ck
p
R qe
0
¯ F(x)dx

−cqe
=1+
Z k
qe
∂a(y)
∂y
dy
≤1+
Z k
qe
 
y
qe
−m
+(m−1)
!
/(mq
e) dy
=1+
 
k
1−m

k
qe
−m
−
q
e
1−m

q
e
qe
−m
+(m−1)(k−q
e)
!
/(mq
e)
=1+
 
1
1−m

k
qe
1−m
−
1
1−m
+(m−1)(
k
qe −1)
!
/m
=
 
k
qe
 
m−1+
1
1−m

k
qe
−m!
−
1
1−m
+1
!
/m. 
Lemma 2. Under the same assumptions as in Lemma 1, when ¯ F(k)=δ we have k·δ1/m ≤q
e.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume q
e <k·δ1/m. This leads to a contradiction (inequality (38)):
δ = ¯ F(k)=e
−
R k
0 g(t)/tdt =e
−
R qe
0 g(t)/tdt ·e
−
R k
qe g(t)/tdt ≤1·e
−
R k
qe g(qe)/tdt =(k/q
e)
−g(qe)
≤(k/q
e)
−m (37)
<(k/(k·δ
1/m))
m =δ. (38)
Inequality (37) holds because p ¯ F(1−g(q
e))≤c, implying g(q
e)≥m. Inequality (38) follows from our assump-
tion, q
e <k·δ1/m. 
Proof of Theorem 8. The case when β =1 is equivalent to the unconstrained problem which is addressed
in Perakis and Roels (2006). Therefore, ﬁx channel capacity k and assume β >1, so that q
s =k. When β >1,
the probability of excess demand, which we will denote by δ, is ﬁxed and satisﬁes β =δp/c.
Fix a c.d.f. F ∈F(k,β). The eﬃciency Eﬀ(F) of F satisﬁes the following lower bound:
Eﬀ(F)
def = E[pS(q
eq)−cq
eq]/E[pS(k)−ck]
≥E[pS(q
e)−cq
e]/E[pS(k)−ck] (39)
=

p
Z qe
0
¯ F(x)dx

−cq
e

/

p
Z k
0
¯ F(x)dx

−ck

≥m/
 
k
qe
 
m−1+
1
1−m

k
qe
−m!
−
1
1−m
+1
!
(40)
≥
 
1
β
·
1
1−m
1/m
β −1+m
m

−

1
1−m
!−1
. (41)
In particular, inequality (39) follows because q
e ≤ q
eq ≤ q
s. Inequality (40) follows from Lemma 1. The
function on the right-hand side of inequality (40) is decreasing as q
e decreases and from Lemma 2 we know
that the equilibrium order quantity q
e satisﬁes q
e ≥ k · δ1/m. Therefore, inequality (41) follows when we
substitute in q
e =k·δ1/m =k(β(1−m))
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It can be veriﬁed that the lower bound in inequality (41) is attained when the c.d.f. F is taken equal to
H, where the c.d.f. H satisﬁes
1. ¯ H(x)=1 for x∈[0,k·δ1/m],
2. ¯ H(x)=(k/x)
m ·δ for x∈[k·δ1/m,∞).
(To verify this claim conﬁrm that q
e = k ·δ1/m, using eq. (3), implying that we can convert the inequalities
in eqs. (39) and (41) into equalities. Furthermore, since the c.d.f. F is taken equal to H, we can convert
the inequalities in eqs. (32),(33), and (35) into equalities. Therefore, inequality (40) becomes an equality.)
The c.d.f. H does not satisfy Assumption 1, because the corresponding density is zero for x ≤ k · δ1/m.
However, it can be approximated arbitrarily closely by c.d.f.s in the class F(k,β) (in particular, that satisfy
Assumption 1), with an arbitrarily small change in the resulting eﬃciency. 
J. Proof: m-suppliers/1-retailer, Set of wholesale prices W(k)
Proof of Theorem 9. First, we write the Lagrangian Ls(q,λ) for CHANNEL(k) and the Lagrangian Lr(q,γ)
for RETAILER(k,w):
Ls(q,λ)=
m X
i=1
 
piE[min(qi,Di)]−ciqi

+
m X
i=1
λiqi +λm+1
 
k−
m X
i=1
qi

,
Lr(q,γ)=
m X
i=1
 
piE[min(qi,Di)]−wiqi

+
m X
i=1
γiqi +γm+1
 
k−
m X
i=1
qi

.
Note that πs(q) and πr(q) are strictly concave for q ∈ [0,l1) × ···[0,lm) because each c.d.f. Fi is strictly
increasing over [0,li). Because the feasible sets are convex and compact, CHANNEL(k) and RETAILER(k,w)
have unique solutions. Furthermore, because of the concavity of the objective function and the fact that the
Slater condition is satisﬁed, any critical point of the respective Lagrangian (that satisﬁes the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions) is the unique maximizer in the respective constrained decision problem. Conversely, the
optimal solution in the respective constrained decision problem must correspond to a unique critical point
of the respective Lagrangian (Sundaram 1996, chap. 7).
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the channel’s decision problem, CHANNEL(k), are:
pj ¯ Fj(qj)−cj +λj −λm+1 =0, j =1,...,m;
qi ≥0, i=1,...,m;
k−
m X
i=1
qi ≥0;
λiqi =0, i=1,..m;
λm+1
 
k−
m X
i=1
qi

=0;
λi ≥0, i=1,...,m+1.
Let (q
s,λ) denote the unique vector that satisﬁes these conditions.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the retailer’s decision problem, RETAILER(k,w), are:
pj ¯ Fj(qj)−wj +γj −γm+1 =0, j =1,...,m;
qi ≥0, i=1,...,m;
k−
m X
i=1
qi ≥0;
γiqi =0, i=1,...,m;
γm+1
 
k−
m X
i=1
qi

=0;
γi ≥0, i=1,...,m+1.
Let (q
r(w),γ) denote the unique vector that satisﬁes these conditions.
Let M ={1,...,m} and Z
def = {i∈M | q
s
i =0}. Therefore, M \Z is the set of items ordered by the system
when solving its decision problem. Similarly, let Zr(w)
def = {i ∈ M | q
r
i(w) = 0}, so that M \Zr(w) is the set
of items ordered by the retailer when solving its decision problem. Because of the uniqueness of the channel
optimal solution, a wholesale price vector (w1,...,wm) will coordinate the retailer’s portfolio decision (i.e.,
q
r(w)=q
s) if and only if Zr(w)=Z and q
r
i(w)=q
s
i for every i / ∈Z.
We claim that q
r(w)=q
s if and only if conditions (42)–(44) hold:
α∈[0,λm+1], (42)
wj −cj =wi −ci
def = α, ∀i,j / ∈Z, (43)
wt ≥pt −λm+1 +α, ∀t∈Z. (44)
Suppose q
r
i(w)=q
s
i, for all i. Eq. (42) follows because
0≤γm+1 ≤λm+1
which implies that there exists an α∈[0,λm+1] such that
0≤λm+1 −α=γm+1.
Necessity for condition (43) follows because −cj + λj − λm+1 = −wj + γj − γm+1 and γj = λj = 0, when
j / ∈Z, implying
cj +λm+1 =wj +γm+1 ∀j / ∈Z.
Necessity for condition (44) follows because, when t∈Z, pt−wt+γt−γm+1 =0 and γt ≥0 hold, implying
λm+1 −α=γm+1 ≥pt −wt ∀t∈Z.
Now we show suﬃciency by showing that conditions (42),(43),(44) imply Zr(w) = Z and q
r
i(w) = q
s
i for
every i / ∈ Zr(w). Using conditions (43) and (44) we rewrite the KKT conditions for the retailer’s decision
problem, RETAILER(k,w):
pj ¯ Fj(qj)−cj +γj −(γm+1 +α)=0, ∀j / ∈Z; (45)Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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pt ¯ Ft(qt)−(pt −λm+1 +α+δt)+γt −γm+1 =0, ∀t∈Z; (46)
δt =wt −(pt −λm+1 +α)≥0, ∀t∈Z;
qi ≥0, i=1,...,m;
k−
m X
i=1
qi ≥0;
γiqi =0, i=1,...,m;
γm+1
 
k−
m X
i=1
qi

=0;
γi ≥0, i=1,...,m+1.
When γm+1 =λm+1 −α, γi =0 for all i / ∈Z, and γi =δi for all i∈Z, we have that (q
s,γ) satisﬁes the KKT
conditions for RETAILER(k,w). Note that (q
s,γ) satisﬁes (45) because (q
s,λ) satisﬁes the KKT conditions
for CHANNEL(k) and (46) is satisﬁed because qt =0. Therefore, q
r
i(w)=q
s
i for every i∈M. 
K. Proof: m-suppliers/1-retailer, equilibrium setting
Proof of Theorem 10. It can be shown that each supplier’s payoﬀ function is continuous and quasi-concave
with respect to their own wholesale price; see Sabbaghi et al. (2007). Furthermore, the game is symmetric
and the strategy space (the hypercube of possible wholesale price vectors) is compact and convex. Therefore,
by Theorem 2 in Cachon and Netessine (2004), there exists at least one symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (i.e., wholesale price vector), in which all the suppliers charge the same wholesale price w.
Due to the symmetry in the problem, Z = ∅ (i.e., all the products are included in the channel’s optimal
portfolio). Furthermore, the capacity constraint is tight for the channel, thus the channel’s optimal order
vector is (k/m,...,k/m). The symmetric equilibrium (identical wholesale prices across products) results in
the retailer order vector (k/m,...,k/m) because the retailer’s capacity constraint is also tight under the
condition k ≤m·q
e. Thus the wholesale price vector (w,...,w) is in the set W(k) by deﬁnition. 
L. Proof: Buyback and revenue-sharing contracts continue to coordinate
Proof of Theorem 11. Our proof follows the proof technique given in Cachon (2003) for the 1-supplier,
1-retailer channel in the absence of a capacity constraint.
Our proof has two parts. The ﬁrst part shows that buyback contracts coordinate a capacity-constrained
newsvendor, allocating any fraction of the channel optimal proﬁt among the parties. The second part shows
that buyback contracts are equivalent to revenue sharing contracts in a constrained setting.
Under a buyback contract (w,b) the newsvendor pays w per unit to the supplier for each unit ordered and
is compensated b per unit for any unit unsold at the end of the sales season. We show that if
w =b+c(p−b)/p, b∈[0,p], (47)
then the buyback contract (w,b) coordinates the capacity-constrained newsvendor’s ordering decision, giving
the newsvendor (p−b)/p fraction of the channel-optimal proﬁt and the supplier b/p fraction of the channel-
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We show that under the above buyback contract, (w,b), the channel-optimal order quantity, q
c, equals the
retailer-optimal order quantity, q
r, as well as the supplier-optimal order quantity (i.e., the retailer’s order
quantity that is optimal from the supplier’s point of view), q
s. Indeed,
q
c def = argmax
0≤q≤k
pS(q)−cq
=argmax
0≤q≤k
 
(p−b)/p
 
pS(q)−cq

(48)
=argmax
0≤q≤k
(p−b)S(q)−(w−b)q (Using buyback contract (47))
=argmax
0≤q≤k
pS(q)−wq +b(q −S(q))
def = q
r
and
q
c def = argmax
0≤q≤k
pS(q)−cq
=argmax
0≤q≤k
 
b/p
 
pS(q)−cq

(49)
=argmax
0≤q≤k
bS(q)−(c−w+b)q (Using buyback contract (47))
=argmax
0≤q≤k
wq −cq −b(q −S(q))
def = q
s
Equations (48) and (49) prove that the newsvendor and supplier receive
 
(p−b)/p

and
 
b/p

fractions,
respectively, of the channel-optimal proﬁt.
Next, we remind the reader that buyback contracts and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent (regardless
of the channel’s capacity constraint). Under a revenue sharing contract the newsvendor purchases each unit
from a supplier at a price of wr per unit, keeps a fraction f of the revenue, and shares a fraction (1 − f)
of the revenue with the supplier. A given buyback contract, (w,b), is a revenue sharing contract where the
newsvendor purchases at w−b per unit from the supplier and in return shares a fraction b/p of the revenue
with the supplier. Similiarly, a given revenue sharing contract, (wr,f), is a buyback contract where the
newsvendor purchases at wr + (1 − f)p per unit and is compensated (1 − f)p per unit by the supplier for
any unsold items at the end of the sales season. Since there is a one-to-one mapping from buyback contracts
to revenue sharing contracts and because buyback contracts coordinate a constrained newsvendor’s ordering
decision, we conclude that revenue sharing contracts also coordinate a constrained newsvendor’s ordering
decision. 
M. Proof: Necessary and suﬀ. conditions for risk-sharing contracts to coordinate
Proof of Theorem 12. Let
B
def = {(u,v) | u=(1−λ)v +λp, λ∈[c/p,F(k)]}
and
A
def = {(u,v) | c≤u≤p,v ≤u}.Sabbaghi, Sheﬃ, and Tsitsiklis: Coordination capability of linear wholesale price contracts
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The proof has two parts. First we show every buyback contract (w,b) ∈ B ⊆ A channel-coordinates the
newsvendor’s decision. Then, we show that there are no other buyback contracts in the set A that can
channel-coordinate the newsvendor’s decision. Before we proceed note that the optimal order quantity for
the constrained channel is k (because ¯ F(k)>c/p). Thus, the capacity constraint is tight.
First we show that every buyback contract (w,b) ∈ B channel-coordinates. If (w,b) ∈ B, then w − b =
λ(p−b) for some λ∈[c/p, ¯ F(k)]. The newsvendor orders min{k, ¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b )}. But
w−b
p−b ∈[c/p, ¯ F(k)], therefore
¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b ) ≥ k and min{k, ¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b )} = k. The newsvendor thus orders the channel-optimal order quantity
for this capacity-constrained channel.
Next we show that there is no buyback contract (w,b) outside of B but in set A that channel-
coordinates the newsvendor’s action. Assume the contrary. Namely, assume a buyback contract (w,b) ∈
A\B channel-coordinates the newsvendor’s action. Under buyback contract (w,b), the constrained newsven-
dor orders min{k, ¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b )}. But since (w,b) channel-coordinates the newsvendor’s decision, we have
min{k, ¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b )}}=k, since the newsvendor’s constraint is tight. Therefore, ¯ F
−1(
w−b
p−b )≥k, implying
w−b
p−b ≤
¯ F(k). Furthermore, min(w,b)∈A
w−b
p−b =
c
p, implying
w−b
p−b ≥
c
p. Thus, (w,b) ∈ B, because w − b = λ(p − b) for
some λ∈[c/p, ¯ F(k)]. But this is a contradiction. 
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